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Abstract 
The article attempts to provide a theoretical framework of international 
socialisation that helps initiate a security community-pattern of relationship 
in the Balkans, in its process of Euro-Atlantic accession. It focuses on the 
interaction between "ideas" and "institutions", and their import for the 
international socialisation of the Balkans. However, it delineates to what 
extent the ideational aspect of neoliberal-constructivism can be applied in 
regional policy-making; and to what extent the process of Southeast European 
socialisation within Euro-Atlantic structures can be used as an instrument for 
attaining regional stability. For this purpose, the investigation defines the 
concept of order for the Balkans. The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic 
organisations are equipped to address the Balkan sources of conflict and 
encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and conditionality of 
membership provides them with significant influence in the region, which in 
turn facilitates regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent 
security community. 
 
 
 
“It would be conceited to claim that we have an important role to play. 
Who are we to teach others lessons?” 
Simeon Saxcoburggotsky, Prime Minister of Bulgaria1 
INTRODUCTION 
The major objective of the Euro-Atlantic (i.e. the EU and NATO) accession of the 
Balkans is the establishment of "a peace order" (Mintchev 2001:3) for the region.2 
                                                          
* Marie Curie Visiting Fellow at SPIRIT-Europe, Aalborg University, Denmark. 
1 Interview with Simeon Saxcoburggotsky on 22 March 2002 at: 
http://www.government.bg/PrimeMinister/Interviews/2002-03-22/1485.html 
2 In "the Balkans" I include the following states: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia. For the purposes of the present paper I am 
using the Balkans and Southeastern Europe interchangeably (as synonyms); nevertheless, I am aware 
of the conceptual debate on their different connotations. 
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However, the above statement by the current Bulgarian Prime Minister is 
indicative of a major stasis of meaning in the Balkans, underscoring its 
fragmentation: the belief that Southeast European actors have nothing to offer for 
the stabilisation of the region. This evinces a kind of regional reliance on the 
international community not only to "sort out" the Balkan mess, but also to 
suggest (i.e. dictate) the way for its implementation. That is why the "existence of 
this international high authority... has freed the local parties of ever having to 
agree on anything meaningful" (Sletzinger 2001:7). Thus, it is the lack of regional 
initiative, rather than the oft-quoted "endemic antagonism", that is the main poser 
for the successful accession of the region to Euro-Atlantic structures.  
 
This is especially clear in the post-September 11 environment, when the "Balkan 
fatigue" (particularly in the US) has nearly developed into "abandonment" of the 
region. Such noticeable lack of interest must put the pressure on Balkan actors to 
initiate joint projects for tackling common problems. Thus, the present theorising 
of Southeast European accession to Euratlantic structures aims at depicting a 
desirable optimal end state: the establishment of a security community in the 
Balkans. The purpose of accession is perceived by this exploration not simply as 
individual regional states becoming members of these institutions; but that in the 
process they establish a particular type of order in the Balkans. In this respect, the 
launch of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SP) in 1999, in theory 
suggests the institution of a patterned relationship around the buzzwords of 
socialisation, reciprocity and intersubjectivity.3 However, its praxis (and the fact 
that it took the international community several "Balkan wars" and thousands of 
dead and displaced to formulate the SP) has, so far, failed to materialise this 
expectation. 
 
The current article queries whether it is possible to detect in the theory and praxis 
of international socialisation cooperational frameworks that can be initiated 
without (necessarily) requiring trust or solidarity among the actors; but which (in 
the process of interaction) can lead to establishing trust and solidarity among 
them. Evincing such patterns would help the development of similar frameworks 
for Balkan cooperation that can establish long-term trust and solidarity among 
regional actors. In its essence, this is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework 
of international socialisation that helps initiate a security community-pattern of 
relationship in the region, in its process of Euro-Atlantic accession. Broadly 
defined socialisation involves the transmission of the rules of socially appropriate 
                                                          
3 For an insightful study of the topic see Vucetic (2002). 
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behaviour among actors and in practical terms it provides guidelines to states and 
their leaders about how they are supposed to behave in the international system. 
Consequently, in such an altered and complicated environment as the one in the 
Balkans, the challenge to policy-makers of order formation in the Balkans is both 
pragmatic (how to adjust policy and devise new policy to changing circumstances) 
and substantive (how to adjust pre-existing perceptions and attitudes to accord 
with new realities). 
 
This research focuses on the current debate in International Relations (IR) theory 
on the interaction between "ideas" and "institutions", and their import for the 
international socialisation of the Balkans. However, it delineates to what extent the 
ideational aspect of neoliberal-constructivism can be applied in regional policy-
making; and to what extent the process of Southeast European socialisation within 
Euro-Atlantic structures can be used as an instrument for attaining regional 
stability. For this purpose, the investigation defines the concept of order for the 
Balkans. The objective of its theoretical considerations is to inform regional 
policy-making and decision-taking with the prospects from cooperation and 
community-building in the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. 
 
The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic organisations are equipped to address the 
Balkan sources of conflict and encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and 
conditionality of membership provides them with significant influence in the 
region. This socialisation occurs in terms of altering domestic practices through 
compliance and learning, and in changing external behaviour. These processes, in 
turn facilitate regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent security 
community. 
  
WHAT IS ORDER 
The pragmatic purpose for grappling with the issue of international order is to 
provide a definition that suggests a potential for reform in the Balkan region. 
Thus, order is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the 
sense of self-sustaining continuity) is rationalised as a mechanism for maintaining 
a structure of power; and power stands for the exchange between different forms 
and sources of authority. In this way, a political order gives meaning to and makes 
sense of the relations and interactions in the international society. That is why, 
order is about control (in the sense of checks and balances): regulating the 
participants' resources, their use and distribution. It sets the framework within 
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which they can be meaningfully utilised and the types of interactions that the 
members can have. 
 
Since the aim of this exploration is not to exhaust the meaning of the concept of 
order, but, instead, to suggest a framework for the discussions of Balkan order, 
this study would like to emphasise three distinct aspects of order: solidarity, 
regulation and security (Rengger 2000). In spite of the fact that more often than 
not these aspects overlap it is the distinct interaction between them that can 
suggest a relationship-pattern for overcoming the current stalemate in the meaning 
of order in the Balkans. The order that this study wants to proffer for Southeastern 
Europe is security community. 
 
The self-sustaining continuity of order derives from the interaction between actors, 
whose behaviour in the international arena is embedded in intersubjective 
understandings and expectations. This intersubjectivity is constituted by the 
collective meanings that actors hold for each other. At the same time, interaction is 
as much the result of a "social contract" (in the sense of a recognition of the 
negative effects the disintegration of this system of exchange can have on the 
actors' own interests and that of the other participants) as well as a consequence of 
the "solidarity" among the participants, deriving from their "shared values" and 
"shared interests" (Wallace 1997:228. Emphasis added). The recognition of the 
interests of the rest points to an awareness of the existence of international 
community. This communitarism stems from a belief that actors have to work 
together for the internationalisation of the democratic community so that they can 
protect themselves from the negative effects of global economic and social forces. 
In other words they embed their roles in the context of belonging to an 
international society (Bull 1979). The understanding of their actions as 
conforming to a pattern of predictability is borne out of the social interaction 
between actors to preserve the structure of order.  
 
Order can be "defined primarily in terms of negotiated connections among 
externally autonomous and internally integrated" actors (March and Olsen 
1998:5). It regulates the relationship between actors' corporate identities and their 
social roles as participants in the international arena. The current international 
order establishes different structures for accommodating the objectives of 
individual actors. In this way, through the regulatory aspect of order, what used to 
be interstate interaction gradually developed into (or more precisely is still 
developing towards) supra-national, non-territorial relations. In this way, order 
identifies actors as separate entities and develops a pattern of predictability 
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through which it mediates their individual goals. At the same time, however, it 
initiates a process of structural change within its participants, in which they 
substitute a portion of their identity in favour of their own (as well as that of the 
system of order) stability. Such identity transformation results from the process of 
social interaction among actors. Changing the context of interaction (i.e. increased 
interdependence and societal convergence) modifies actors' expectations (in the 
context of "character planning"), which, subsequently, affects not only their 
behaviour, but brings about "critical self-reflection... to think of oneself in novel 
terms" (Wendt 1992:419). Thus, their identity is influenced by the relationship-
pattern of predictability, where order allows for re-evaluation of actors' interests 
and identities without endangering the continuity of its stability. 
 
The other important aspect of international order is the establishment of a sense of 
security (among the individual participants). Security is understood as knowledge 
of order's ability to overcome successfully (without disintegration into violence) 
disruptions to its patterns of predictability. Security is a process of continuous 
sanction (in the sense of guarantee) that the system of order protects the 
participating actors from adverse contingencies. In an applied sense, security 
indicates "a low probability of damage to acquired values" (Baldwin 1997:13). 
Therefore, the stability of order indicates its ability “to contain and overcome 
disturbances to order” (Ikenberry 2001:45). This is where the importance of the 
normative culture among actors in the international arena, becomes so important: 
because it constitutes a base that buttresses individual confidence in the 
potentiality of the mutual control over the system's checks and balances.  
 
Such definition of order as interaction between its three aspects (solidarity, 
regulation and security) articulates a distinct pattern of predictability, which 
regulates the intersubjective relationship between actors. The significance of this 
framework of order (i.e. for the discussion of Balkan order) derives from its 
emphasis on international relations as a process of learning and socialisation, 
during which actors develop a cognitive understanding (based on their experience 
of interaction in the international arena) of the reciprocity of international society 
as a security community. This reciprocity (in the context of solidarity) underscores 
the belonging to a community sharing a common normative base. Such 
interdependence mediates actor's interests and regulates their exchange within a 
secure framework of order's stability. Thus, this particular understanding of order 
constitutes a pattern, which allows for peaceful exchange and interest-mediation, 
as well as joint decision-taking and non-territorially-based policy-making. 
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However, prior to dealing with the socialisation dynamic some theoretical matters 
for the understanding and explanation of this process are on order. 
 
DIFFERENT THEORETICAL VIEWS AND ORDER 
Bearing in mind the pragmatic approach to the socialisation dynamic of the 
Balkans – i.e. the purpose of this examination of order is not to exhaust its 
meaning, but rather to position it in a way that would suggest an analytical 
framework for establishing a security-community-type of order in the Balkans in 
the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures – this investigation is 
objective to the extent of its awareness of the different theoretical perspectives on 
order, but it is at the same time prescriptive as to its goals. For the purposes of 
clarity this article looks only at the dominant orthodoxies of IR theory: neorealism, 
neoliberalism and constructivism. The focus is on the "kind of knowledge" (Wendt 
1999:377) of international relations that the three analytical frameworks produce, 
and in what way can it be used for theorizing the present state of order in 
Southeastern Europe. Thus, this is an attempt to arrive at a set of useful theoretical 
indicators of a security-community-type of order, which can suggest the necessary 
pragmatic instruments for establishing cooperative relations among Balkan actors. 
This overview suggests the potential for adopting "neoliberal constructivism" as 
the theory underscoring the establishment of a prospective Balkan order. 
 
NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
From a neorealist (Waltz 1979) perspective, the actor of the international system 
of order is the nation-state; while, international politics is the struggle for power –
understood as the ability to influence or resist such influence on the behaviour of 
actors (Buzan et al. 1993). Interstate relations are "always power politics: for it is 
impossible to eliminate power from them" (Carr 1981/ 1939:145). Thus, 
international order is viewed as anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority 
to mediate the relations between states and these states are dependent upon 
themselves (their resources) for the protection of their national interests. Interstate 
interaction is driven by the logic of a "self-help" system, in which collective 
security and closer cooperation are impossible, because of the egotistic, self-
interested and suspicious-of-the-other attitude of each actor. For realists, the only 
means to avoid conflict (war) in such an anarchical system is through the 
development of some sort of hierarchy among states (based on their material 
resources to exert influence). State preferences are usually fixed and conflictual, 
that is why interstate politics become a constant bargaining game (Powell 1999). 
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The pattern of actor-socialisation within a neorealist order is very much 
conditioned by anarchy, rather than the internalisation of ethical norms of 
international relations linked to rights, justice and morality. Actors are led by the 
logic of anarchy, or they are eliminated (Sigel 1970). Thus, compliance is 
achieved only to the extent that an actor is forced to abide by certain rules, 
delineated by the threat from an immanent punishment. For instance, one can take 
the post-Dayton Accords behaviour of Serbia/Montenegro as such example. As 
soon as what was left of the former Yugoslav union perceived that the threat from 
the international community would not be acted upon the Kosovo conflict became: 
(a) a trial of the military capabilities and mostly commitment of the international 
community to deliver on its promises – a test, which as far as Serbia/Montenegro 
is concerned, the Yugoslav army won (Ignatieff 2001:91-219); and (b) it brought 
into question the neorealist concept of non-intervention in intra-state affairs, and to 
a certain extent a case may be made that it violated current international law set up 
to protect state-sovereignty.4 Nevertheless, the Kosovo conflict proved that 
without compulsion an actor would not submit to the signals of the international 
system. 
 
The unfeasibility of providing a viable solution to the problem of Southeast 
European security (in a neorealist international order) comes from the virtual 
impossibility of collective security based on cooperation. The system of anarchy (a 
complex balancing act between states, each desiring to become a hegemon) makes 
collaboration between states almost unattainable. In the realist model, the closest 
nation-states can come to working together is by forming alliances. However, 
alliances (seen as temporary organisations) are formed according to perceived 
hostile intentions of a state (or a group of states) against another (or a group), and 
as such they represent a "balance-of-threat" mechanism as opposed to balance-of-
power (Walt 1987). 
 
As a policy framework, the neorealist view of order is problematic when 
elaborating a prospective relationship-pattern in the Balkans, because of its 
underlying pattern of enmity. On a pragmatic level, it would be very difficult for a 
neorealist framework of analysis to be translated into a practical foreign-policy 
mechanism rooted in a relationship-pattern that would allow actors (not just states) 
to identify positively with one another in the context of a security community. The 
reason being the neorealist assumption that anarchy (the lack of centralised 
                                                          
4 Although as Malcolm (1998:264-5) argues Kosovo was never legally recognized under international 
law as part of Yugoslavia. 
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authority) at the international level (the macro-structure) is interpreted in state 
(highly-centralised) policy-making during international interaction (the micro-
structure) as preserving one's survivability in the natural selection process of the 
neorealist marketplace (Archer 1995). Thus, neorealist theory presents a pattern in 
which actors behave in a way that is dictated by the framework of anarchy of 
international relations (and the perceived malicious intentions among actors), 
rather than from the actual knowledge of the other actors' intent (Wendt 
1999:264). Partly, the reason for the current instability of the Balkans is this "lack 
of interaction" (acting according to assumptions rather than knowledge of the 
other), which hampers the prospect for regional interaction. 
 
NEOLIBERAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
The other major tradition in IR is neoliberal institutionalism (Baldwin 1993). For 
neoliberal institutionalists the main actors in the international arena still continue 
to be nation-states; however, they suggest a plethora of non-state actors 
(international and transnational organisations, non-governmental organisation, 
multinational corporations, etc.) as important participants in the process of 
international relations. Institutions in this context are understood to be "a relatively 
stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific 
groups of actors in specific situations" (March and Olsen 1998:8). Neoliberal 
institutionalism presents interstate relations as the complex interdependence of 
distinctive political processes, which translate power's sources into power as 
control of outcomes (Keohane and Nye 1997). The institutions, suggested by 
neoliberal theory, seek "to reduce the uncertainty [of the anarchic system], lower 
transaction costs, and solve collective action problems" (Ikenberry 2001:15). 
 
Both the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of neoliberal institutionalism 
make it a very interesting proposition for outlining a framework of analysis, which 
can support the development of a prospective order for the Balkans. However, the 
post-Cold War years have posed a number of challenges in the Balkans, which 
suggest certain limitations to the logic of neoliberal institutionalism. The benefits 
of socialisation within the rules and procedures of neoliberal institutionalism are 
subjected to the costs of rationalist materialism. Institutionalism alone would not 
introduce an awareness of "common fate", "shared identity" and "we-feeling". It 
can initiate such a process, but there is also the opportunity that it can generate a 
Balkan alliance system of regional divisions and suspicions. In this sense, the 
institutional approach can be effective if it is internalised by all actors involved as 
a mechanism for building trust among them (and not one-way monologue from the 
IJIS Volume 1
E. KAVALSKI – THEORIZING EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIALIZATION 
 
 
 25
EU and NATO towards the Balkans). Thus, the process of enlargement of the EU 
and NATO often tends to be interpreted as a lack of commitment by Euro-Atlantic 
structures to the region, something that brings into question the policies used to 
promote regional stability and security (as for instance the rhetorical hype during 
the launch of the SP and its virtual non-functioning, let alone delivery today). 
Alterations in state behaviour alone within institutional limits (at least in 
Southeastern Europe) are not enough to make the region a place of economic, 
political and social stability, security and cooperation. Achieving this requires a 
thorough investigation into actors' interests and identities: how do they take shape 
and how (if at all) can they be influenced (and changed) in the process of interstate 
interaction. 
 
CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
The end of the Cold War era has posed a number of questions to rationalist 
analysis (both neorealist and neoliberal) of international relations, the majority of 
them querying its focus on the state-centric model. Developments in the former 
Eastern Bloc, and especially in the Balkans, during the 1990s emphasised the 
importance of maintaining peaceful relations through cooperation. However, both 
neorealism and neoliberalism failed to deliver a pattern of cooperative and stable 
relations (in the sense of social, political and economic development) among the 
Southeast European states. Instead the strategy of deterrence, attempted by a 
number of international actors, further exacerbated the situation in the region. 
Partly, the reason for this failure of rationalist approaches, was (1) their inability to 
comprehend the complexity, as well as the diversity of the security dilemmas in 
the Balkans and (2) take into account the individual human input into the 
construction of these dilemmas (and hence their solution). Their models remain to 
a large extent on the state (inter-governmental) level, without considering the 
process of formation of state preferences and interests on the societal level. 
 
The theoretical basis for the study of actors' identities and interests has been called 
constructivism (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999). Constructivism investigates the 
influence of international interaction on actors' interests and identities, and 
challenges the rationalist (both realist and neoliberal) "two-step" (Legro 1996). 
Constructivism proposes that systemic interaction transforms state interests and, in 
the process, even affects their identity (i.e. the logic of anarchy is not fixed). 
Actually, it asserts that the dynamics of international relations are the result of 
actors' need and purposes. Thus, actors' actions (or inactions) are constituted by 
collective meanings. For example "states act differently towards enemies than they 
IJIS Volume 1
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  NO.1 (2003) 
 
26  
do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not" (Wendt 
1992:397). Constructivism also posits that the process of interaction informs the 
meanings in which actors' behavior is organized. The underscoring mechanism in 
interstate relations is learning: interaction reinforces some international processes 
by rewarding actors "for holding certain ideas about each other", and, at the same 
time, discourages them from holding others (Wendt 1992:405). Constructivism 
asserts that actors' identities and interests are formed in the process of interaction 
and are not given prior to it (hence they are not primordial). State identity is 
defined through relations with other states. The process of international relations 
gives meaning to concepts such as "state sovereignty" and "national territoriality". 
 
Constructivism develops the role of identity and interests in international 
interaction. The experience of inter-actor relations develops a repository of 
knowledge about each other, which they use as a basis for their action towards one 
another. However, constructivism alone would not be sufficient to construct a 
theoretical model for a prospective Balkan order. Its idealism (in the sense of 
emphasising how ideas and culture constitute the content and meaning of 
materialist power and interests) provides a rather abstruse theoretical framework 
for influencing decision-making in the region (Wendt 1999:370-7). In order to 
overcome the abstraction of constructivism and also to assist the incorporation of 
its analysis into Balkan policy-making there is a need of rationalist tools to 
instantiate the practices that lead to shared identification among regional actors 
into a security-community-type of order. Owing to the prevalent rationalism of 
Southeast European relations, as well as the dominant position of negative 
identification among the main actors in the region (mainly nation-states, or entities 
aspiring to such status), the only viable approach would be one that would 
combine neoliberal practices with constructivist ideation. 
 
NEOLIBERAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
Neoliberal constructivism (being an eclectic approach) combines in its 
understanding of international order rationalist (interest-based and power-based) 
and cognitive (knowledge-based) perspectives. Applying it to the Balkans involves 
foregrounding the aspects that hold the promise of establishing a stable and 
cooperative pattern of relations. The main aspects of neoliberal-constructivist 
order are: institutions - based on mutual agreements, whose normative "stickiness" 
and institutional autonomy proffer cooperation; and interaction - the process of 
interest and identity formation, which develops experiential knowledge among 
actors and introduces positive identification and community building. Thus, 
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neoliberalism provides the rules and procedures for institutional co-binding, while 
constructivism facilitates the learning of new practices and the establishment of 
trust among actors. Combining these two theoretical concepts of international 
relations allows putting the issue of prospective Balkan order in its rightful 
context: as a distinct pattern based on the interaction between the solidarity, 
regulation and security aspects of order. 
 
Establishing such an order in the Balkans entails the development of institutional 
networks that help develop positive intersubjective meanings among actors. The 
theoretical basis for such pattern can be elicited from the emphasis on the 
weakening position of state actors, followed by the diminishing relevance of 
military security in the context of "complex interdependence". The neoliberal 
notion of "complex interdependence", emphasises that "(1) states are not the only 
significant actors - transnational actors working across state boundaries are also 
major actors; (2) force is not the only significant instrument - economic 
manipulation and the use of international institutions is the dominant instrument; 
(3) security is not the dominant goal - welfare is the dominant goal" (Nye 
1993:169). In this way, institutionalism stresses its pragmatic qualities for 
facilitating the establishment of closer cooperation among Southeast European 
actors. Within the context of the SP, the promotion of economic and social welfare 
is understood as a tool for initiating regional actors into a process of working 
together. This in turn is expected to promote peaceful coexistence (in the sense of 
actor-behaviour that would make the recourse to violence obsolete), which offers 
solution to some of the current problems of Balkan order. Thus, institutions can be 
helpful for creating expectations among actors that they would "behave" in an 
accepted (or agreed upon) way in particular situations. 
 
However, what constructivism contributes to this process is the understanding that 
"complex interdependence" translates into "complex learning" – i.e. the dynamics 
of identity-/interest-formation (Wendt 1999:170). Namely, the process of 
interaction makes actors learn about each other, which provides them with 
knowledge of what to expect from each other. Thus, within the context of 
neoliberal institutionalism they agree to work together, which initially affects only 
their behavior. However, the continual practice (re-enaction of the norms, which 
initiated the process) prompts them to "internalize" the rules and procedures, 
which subsequently affects their identities (how they perceive themselves and the 
other actors) (Wendt 1999:327). In this way actors participate in the pattern of 
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international relations according to the expectations that its rules (instituted 
through "complex interdependence") have been established (and are beneficial).  
 
Within such a framework, neoliberal-constructivism should be understood as a 
"common sense" pattern of international relations (Wendt 1999:296). It is this 
context that allows developing a certain pattern of interdependence, based on 
shared norms and collective identity, which emphasises order as a security 
community. 
 
A security community is an inter-actor relationship that maintains "dependable 
expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett 1998:30). It represents a 
peaceful, nonviolent international order that elicits the importance of non-national, 
collective identity. In many respects it is the very opposite of realist power 
politics. A security community arises from the process of interaction in which 
actors develop their knowledge of shared meanings and values. The self-sustaining 
continuity of security communities is the result from the institutional self-
enforcing agreement among actors. Neoliberalism offers an opportunity to 
socialise the actors within the norms and rules of the security community. 
Institutions provide the framework for internalising the values beliefs and 
behaviour consistent with their rules, which establish a political culture of 
legitimacy (Wendt 1999:272). In this context, actors' acquisition of the 
institutional rules, helps overcome adversarial polarisations in their relations, 
which subsequently leads to developing stable expectation about each other 
(owing to the internalisation of institutional procedures). Thus, the legitimacy of 
the institutional basis of inter-actor relations within a security community ensures 
"that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will 
settle their disputes in some other way" (Deutsch 1957:5). Thus, the normative 
base of institutions constitutes the regulatory authority of order. It is in this way 
that the establishment of common rules for involving actors in a relationship of 
complex interdependence allows them to begin developing collective interests and 
knowledge of each other. Being always in process, actors' interests and identities 
constantly relearn the benefits from developing positive meanings of each other.  
 
Thus, combining the insights of neoliberalism and constructivism informs the 
study of international orders, and proffers a potential model for theorizing a 
Balkan pattern of international relations. The analytical implications of combining 
institutionalism with interest and identity-interaction suggests a pattern of order 
based on the exchange between different forms and sources of authority, which 
regulate actors' resources (their use and distribution) in the environment of a 
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security community. It provides the basis for promoting institutions for interaction 
between regional actors that can contribute to a process of shared identification. 
The dynamics of common intersubjective meanings has been referred to as 
socialisation. The current process of accession and association with Euro-Atlantic 
structures is expected to put forward a development suggestive of regional 
cooperation in the Balkans. 
 
REGIONAL COOPERATION AND SOCIALISATION 
The defining moment of any international order is its handling of crises. Crisis 
marks the boundary of a security community. It indicates a denial of the “trust and 
shared values among actors” (Bially-Mattern 2001:356). However, the question 
for establishing order in the Balkans is how to initiate a security-community-
relationship among regional actors out of the current crisis (marked by a lack) of 
intra-regional interaction in Southeastern Europe? In the context of the theoretical 
analysis of neoliberal-constructivism the query can be modified as to what type of 
socialisation facilitates the establishment of regional institutions that can introduce 
cooperative exchange in the region? And what is the role of Euro-Atlantic 
structures in assisting (or hindering) such process? 
 
The establishment of a security community in the Balkans can be achieved 
through instituting cooperation among regional actors around issue areas of 
common concern. The expectation is that joint work for tackling such problems 
can help socialise not just the expert-groups directly involved in this exchange, but 
also can contribute to trust-building among societies. Naturally, in its initial stages, 
this could not be the optimal form of a security-community-order. It can be an 
“organisational emulation” of the Euratlantic pattern of institutionalised behaviour 
(Vucetic 2002:113). 
 
The assumption of this research is that the establishment of peaceful order in the 
Balkans is premised on the external promotion of a “nascent security community” 
(Adler and Barnett 1996:36) in the region. Its institution could set the Balkans on 
the course of developing intersubjective relationships that (in the long run) could 
lead to the optimal form of regional security community. However, owing to the 
pragmatics of its promotion, this research would focus primarily on the 
socialization practices that can initiate a nascent security community. Being the 
first stage of a process of regional (re-) building, the nascent security community 
requires material incentives (for instance, conditionality) to sustain its pattern of 
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relationships. Nevertheless, its institutional framework could provide the 
environment for interaction, which could lead to the development of shared 
expectations for appropriate behaviour (i.e. logic of predictability, which can 
facilitate the building of trust).  
 
The expectation is that the current involvement of international structures (i.e. 
Euro-Atlantic institutions) in the Balkans can create the facilitating domestic 
conditions for regional actors (by diffusing “‘selected’ liberal practices”) to initiate 
a security community-type of order (Adler 1997:250). Such relationship can result 
from a redefinition of the acquis process for Balkan actors that would reflect their 
particularism (in the sense of providing assistance, according to specific needs and 
problems), and at the same time stress the importance of the idea and practice of 
cooperation. 
 
Probably the main obstacle for instituting cooperative behaviour in the Balkans is 
the unwillingness of regional actors to identify with each other. The reasons are: 
(1) the current involvement of Euratlantic structures in regional conflict resolution 
focuses on individual actors (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Macedonia) 
without involving more regional actors (or the region as a whole) in their 
mediation; and (2) the subsequent pejorative connotation of the region as a symbol 
of instability and division (hence, "Balkanization"). Some regional actors (i.e. 
Croatia) fear regional cooperation, because of its reputed threat to whatever 
stability individual actors have succeeded to maintain. 
 
However, both these points help not only in understanding the need for 
cooperative behaviour in the Balkans, but also for initiating regional cooperation. 
The starting point is the definition of region as an area within which there is a 
more "intensive co-operation" between countries and communities than in their 
interactions with the other parts of the world (Simai 1994: v. Emphasis added). 
The first issue that strikes one is the definition of the Balkans as a region in the 
sense of intensive co-operation. The recent developments in Southeastern Europe 
have indicated just the opposite kind of processes - antagonism and confrontation. 
So, in this sense, is Southeastern Europe a region? According to this definition - 
not! But when one takes into consideration the external perception on Southeast 
European developments, then the answer is - yes! The Balkans is defined not by 
its awareness of itself as an entity, but by the other regions' discernment of the 
area as idiosyncratic. Because of the connotations from Balkan identification, 
regional actors try to disassociate themselves as much as possible from their 
neighbours in an attempt to dispel this view of the Balkans as a peculiar entity. 
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However, these efforts (ironically) further entrench the belief of the outside world, 
that Southeastern Europe is an area with its own, inimitable characteristics of 
antagonism and instability. In this sense, perhaps paradoxically, working together 
can help regional actors disassociate themselves from the negative identification 
of their belonging to the Balkans. That is why, within such context, the 
relationship of the region with the Euratlantic structures needs to satisfy the 
diverse interest of all actors (which can come only from cooperation). This 
understanding beckons an explanation of how socialisation works and what in the 
current process of Euro-Atlantic accession proffers the initiation of a security 
community. 
 
More formally, the international socialisation of Southeastern Europe through the 
accession process is premised on the development of stable institutions of inter- 
and intra-state relations. In itself it is a “process that is directed toward a state’s 
internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its 
international environment” (Shimmelfennig 2000:111. Emphasis original). In 
other words, it refers to a process through which institutions, practices, and norms 
are transmitted between international actors. Being a complex and context-specific 
process, socialisation (for the purposes of this study) is understood to comprise 
two complementary aspects: compliance (socialisation by international 
organisations) and learning to comply (socialisation in international 
organisations). This indicates that the process of international socialisation has two 
sides: one, potentially coercive and the other – educational. Both of them are 
characterised by their own set of means for achieving adherence to the externally 
promoted rules, however their effectiveness can be assessed in their 
complementarity. 
 
The process of conditionality linked to accession is the main proponent of the 
socialisation by international organisations. In this context, the level of compliance 
is related (i) to expected rewards, and (ii) to avoiding specific punishments (i.e. 
threat of sanctions). The implications for generating cooperative behaviour in the 
Balkans are that enforcement is required to deter states from shirking (Tallberg 
2002:612). The power of attraction of the socialising agencies (the EU and 
NATO) puts them in a strong bargaining position, which allows them to shape the 
procedures and monitor the implementation of rules and norms. For example, the 
“New PHARE Orientations for Pre-Accession Assistance” adopted in 1997 
emphasise that it is the EU (through its Accession Partnerships) and not the 
beneficiaries that decide how PHARE money is spent. Thus, “mandatory 
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adaptation” (Barbara Lippert and Peter Becker quoted in Brusis 2002:534) effects 
adherence to rules by conditioning the actors. Conditionality – “the use of 
incentives to alter a state’s behaviour or policies” (Checkel 2000:1) – emphasises 
the role of the sanctioning authority, which is responsible for monitoring the 
degree of adherence to the promoted norms and rules. In the Balkans (as it has 
already been stated) the principal socialising agencies are the EU and NATO, 
which set up the criteria for accession to their structures. For instance, the 
Copenhagen European Council of 1993 introduced the broad political and 
economic criteria for EU membership, which provided the EU with a mandate to 
monitor, control and guide policy-making in the accession countries. This position 
was re-emphasised in the conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council of 
1997, which suggests the “threshold principle” adopted by the EU, indicating “the 
qualitative and subjective judgements about minimum standards” that applicant 
states must meet in their bid for membership (Jacoby 2001:181). In other words, 
the presence and constant monitoring of this process by the EU offers some 
guarantee that Balkan elites institutionalise and act according to community-
compatible practices. Within this context their compliance with the socialising 
mechanisms is ensured by both the symbolic and instrumental pulling incentives 
of these extra-regional organisations. However, coercive means are required (i) to 
diminish the possibility of free-riding, as well as (ii) to indicate commitment by 
the socialising agency and if necessary make an example of the negative effects of 
non-compliance (as the case of Yugoslavia illustrates). This conclusion 
emphasises the unique position of the Euro-Atlantic institutions (the EU in 
particular) to enforce compliance through the leverage of their supranational 
institutions, and thence (possibly) initiate cooperation in the region. 
 
The socialisation in international organisations occurs through the actual 
interaction by the socialised states with the EU and NATO in partnership and 
association activities. Very often non-compliance occurs not because of a 
deliberate decision of the target to violate the promoted norms and rules, but 
because of the lack of capacity building, rule interpretation and transparency 
(Tallberg 2002:613). Thus, Euro-Atlantic organisations have developed programs 
of learning for accession countries by enhancing the accountability of state 
bureaucracies and providing technical assistance and expertise in the 
implementation of certain programs. For instance, the European Commission 
recognised in 1998 that the “only alternative to long transitional periods is a major 
investment effort” to help applicant countries “adapt to Community norms and 
standards and to develop their infrastructure” (European Report 1998. Emphasis 
added). This conviction is reflected in subsequent initiatives developed by the EU 
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(mainly PHARE and CARDS) aimed at strengthening the programming and 
administrative abilities of candidate countries with the purpose of boosting their 
absorption capacities. One example of the EU fostering domestic institutional 
change is the PHARE “twinning” programme introduced in 1999, in which experts 
from the EU Member States (called “Pre-Accession Advisors”) assist and partner 
their counterparts from accession countries (EC 2001:5). Similarly, NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, introduced at the January 1994 Brussels 
Summit of NATO, is a major initiative to enhance stability and security in the 
applicant countries through capacity building “by promoting the spirit of practical 
cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance” 
(NATO, 2001). In this context, the Balkan accession to Euro-Atlantic structures 
can be viewed as a transnational arrangement to allow time for adapting to 
behavioural requirements (Tallberg 2002:615). In its course, the socialising 
organisation provides authoritative interpretation as well as time for the socialised 
to learn to comply. The power of attraction of extra-regional actors offers the 
stimuli that lead to learning, i.e. policy change (Haas 1990:27-28). Said otherwise, 
the socialisation in international organisations seeks to overcome the ambiguity of 
the promoted norms and build the capacity of the socialised entities to carry out 
their obligations by providing a temporal framework for their implementation 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993:188). 
 
Thus, the power of attraction that the Euro-Atlantic institutions have, allows them 
to become a legitimate authority for evaluating the degree to which its preferred 
norms and rules have become integral part of (i.e. constitutive to) the decision-
making practices of the Balkan states. As it has been outlined in the previous 
chapter, the legitimacy of their involvement derives from the complex discourse 
on accession dynamics, in which “actors regularly refer to the norm to describe 
and comment on their own behavior and that of others, the validity claims of the 
norm are no longer controversial, even if the actual behavior continues violating 
the rules” (Thomas Risse cf. Cortell and Davis 1996:456-57. Emphasis added). 
 
In this way, the two aspects of the international socialisation of the Balkans – 
compliance and learning to comply – are brought together by the Euro-Atlantic 
organisations and promote rule conformity both as a rhetorical practice and 
operational mechanism to justify and facilitate the reproduction of their pattern of 
order. These mutually reinforcing aspects of socialisation develop a common 
process, which develops in three phases: interaction, interpretation and 
internalisation (Koh 1997:2645-649).  
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Interaction occurs in the course of conditioning the target to comply with the 
external agency by convincing it to delegate its sanctioning authority to an 
international institution. This is best evidenced by the influence that Euro-Atlantic 
institutions have in shaping policies in the region through the conditions for 
accession (as well as the prospect of membership). For instance, the 1994 
concluding document from the inaugural conference of the Pact on Stability in 
Europe held in Paris, states that the participants’ “aim is to encourage countries 
which have not yet concluded cooperation and good neighbourliness agreements 
and arrangements, extending also to issues concerning minorities and borders, to 
do so” (EU 1994:100. Emphasis added). Such adoption of superiority powers 
through institutional designs to Euro-Atlantic institutions is a crucial aspect for the 
effectiveness of the socialising interaction (Tallberg 2002:638). It encourages (and 
ensures) respect for appropriate practices and adherence to acceptable patterns of 
behaviour.  
 
Interpretation indicates the mechanisms through which the socialising agency 
translates its requirements to the domestic arena so that it can achieve the 
necessary levels of understanding and, hence, effect compliance. For example, the 
1995 declaration of the Pact on Stability in Europe indicates that the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions “undertake to combine [their] efforts to ensure stability in Europe… 
[by encouraging] states to cooperate across frontiers” (EU 1995:112. Emphasis 
added). This conviction in the teaching capacities is reflected in the words of 
Commission President Jacques Delors, who asserts that the “[European] 
Community has a special responsibility not only because of its importance as a 
pole of stability and prosperity, but also because it has an armoury of instruments 
to deal with the most pressing problems” (Delors 1994:11. Emphasis added). 
 
Internalisation is a matter of practice. It indicates the degree to which the rules and 
norms introduced in the process of interaction and interpreted according to the 
needs of the internal context of the state are actually domesticated in policy-
making. In other words, internalisation “does not require deviant desires or 
behavioural preferences to be completely absent, only that internal (rather than 
external) sanctioning mechanisms are sufficiently effective to prevent deviant 
preferences from becoming norm-violating actions” (Schimmelfennig, 2000:112. 
Emphasis original). However, in the early stages of socialisation, the 
internalisation aspect is induced by the conditions of the socialising agencies. The 
statement of France’s European Affairs Minister, Alain Lamassoure, indicates 
such externally-encouraged internalisation: “No country with unsettled border or 
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minority conflicts will be allowed to join [the EU]” (quoted in The Economist 
1995). 
 
This triple dynamic of socialisation suggests a possibility that can lead not only to 
the transfer of Euro-Atlantic norms and rules to the Balkans, but also the 
replication of their pattern of international relations (i.e. influence foreign-policy-
making in the region). Or as the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten 
put it at the Western Balkans Democracy Forum, the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements “are extremely demanding because they are not just frameworks for 
dialogue and for good relations… Signatories undertake to align their entire legal 
and economic frameworks with that of the EU. They begin to take on the 
obligations of EU membership, and to put in place a network of cooperation and 
free trade agreements with their immediate neighbours” (Patten 2002:2. Emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, as Jonas Tallberg asserts, socialisation premised on the complementarity of 
enforcement and teaching tends to be “particularly effective in securing rule 
conformance” and demonstrates “an enhanced capacity to handle non-compliance” 
(Tallberg, 2002:610). Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic institutions have both 
“sufficient credibility and sufficient potency” (George 1999:12. Emphasis original) 
to maintain this process. The promise of membership once the appropriate 
procedures have been domesticated (i.e. internalised) by the acceding states serves 
as a positive incentive that makes regional actors susceptible to international 
socialisation. The presence of the Euratlantic institutions creates favourable 
conditions that make it possible for the actors in the domestic political process (i) 
to internalise international norms and rules, (ii) to appropriate them “to further 
their interests in the domestic political arena” (Cortell and Davis 1996:471), and 
parallel with that (iii) to reproduce it in their international relations. In other 
words, learning becomes a process of “managed interdependence”, where 
Southeast European states are induced to question “older beliefs and… to 
institutionalise new ways of linking knowledge to the task the entity is supposed to 
carry out” (Haas 1990:37). In short, the emulation of the transparent and 
accountable Euro-Atlantic institutions by Balkan elites, makes them more prone to 
cooperation, since the socialising dynamic makes regional bureaucracies less able 
to disguise their capabilities and intentions (Keohane, 1984:258-9). The existence 
of similar democratic domestic institutions can lead Balkan states to consider each 
other as “not-threatening”, and hence, potential partners. Thus, the norms and 
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rules promoted by Euro-Atlantic structures can become the foundations of shared 
meanings that can suggest the initiation of a nascent security community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The promotion of a secure and stable order in the Balkans must (if not resolve, at 
least) find a way to ensure that all actors involved in the region work together for 
solving common problems. Said otherwise, the establishment of an 
institutionalised setting of Balkan relations can contribute to the introduction of 
stability in the region. Its framework of patterned behaviour involves regional 
actors in a dialogue on common issues and provides them with opportunities to 
exchange information. Thus, this process of exchange based on certain rules and 
procedures can establish shared expectations about each other, which in the 
process of interaction can lead to the establishment of a security community in the 
region. The study of this dynamic entails an examination of the role external actors 
play in the promotion of security-community-relationships in Southeastern 
Europe, as well as the domestic dynamic, which initiates their involvement. 
 
As it has been suggested, in their nascent stage, prospective security communities 
rely (to a large extent) on a complex process of organisational emulation, initiated 
and maintained by third parties. For the Balkans, these extra-regional structures 
are Euro-Atlantic organisations. Their involvement in the region is underlined by 
the policy of promoting a particular intra- (and by implication inter-) state 
relationships aimed at teaching them certain norms and rules of appropriate 
behaviour. In this respect, conditionality (adherence to particular requirements of 
extra-regional actors) has become a pragmatic approach for achieving compliance. 
In other words, the Euro-Atlantic institutions are involved in a process of 
transforming the post-Cold War order in the Balkans to one that is less likely to 
resort to violence for the solution of conflicting issues. Their conflict resolution 
approach can be described as an attempt to socialise Southeast European states 
within a pattern of appropriate behaviour, which can (in the process of accession) 
introduce cooperation (based on shared understandings); and, hence, mitigate the 
instability deriving from the threat of violent conflict. 
 
The argument, then, is that Balkan state-interaction with Euro-Atlantic 
organisations (principally the EU and NATO) leads the latter to propagate norms 
on accepted practices to Southeast European states. These practices relate to 
domestic politics and also to inter-state relations. The rules and norms are 
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propagated in a number of ways. These processes of socialisation, in turn, can 
encourage inter-state cooperation by the Balkan states (i.e. because they have 
adopted similar norms and thus types of practice), which can suggest the 
development of a regional security community. 
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